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Abstract—In the age of Big Data, releasing protected sensitive
data at a future point in time is critical for various applications.
Such self-emerging data release requires the data to be protected
until a prescribed data release time and be automatically released
to the recipient at the release time, even if the data sender goes
offline. While straight-forward centralized approaches provide
a basic solution to the problem, unfortunately they are limited
to a single point of trust and involve a single point of control.
This paper presents decentralized techniques for supporting self-
emerging data using smart contracts in Ethereum blockchain
networks. We design a credible and enforceable smart contract
for supporting self-emerging data release. The smart contract
employs a set of Ethereum peers to jointly follow the proposed
timed-release service protocol allowing the participating peers to
earn the remuneration paid by the service users. We model the
problem as an extensive-form game with imperfect information
to protect against possible post-facto attacks including some peers
destroying the private data (drop attack) or secretly releasing the
private data before the release time (release-ahead attack). We
demonstrate the efficacy and attack-resilience of the proposed
techniques through rigorous analysis and experimental evalua-
tion. Our implementation and experimental evaluation on the
Ethereum official test network demonstrate the low monetary
cost and the low time overhead associated with the proposed
approach and validate its guaranteed security properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of Big Data, releasing protected sensitive data at
a future point in time is critical for various applications. Such
self-emerging data release requires the data to be protected
until a prescribed data release time and be automatically
released to the recipient at the release time, even if the data
sender goes offline [27], [28], [32], [38]. For example, Alice,
who is working in the USA, needs to make some time-
sensitive documents (e.g., press releases, online exam papers)
be received by Bob exactly at 9 a.m. in Bob’s time zone.
Considering the time difference, without having to stay online
at 3 a.m., Alice may prefer to send out the documents at her
most convenient time while still making the documents be
released to Bob at 9 a.m. In another example, Carol, as she
is getting old, may intend to draw up a will that can only be
released to her families after three years.
Centralized systems such as cloud storage services [1], [6],
[7] may provide a simple and straight-forward approach for
implementing self-emerging data release. The service provider
may simply keep the sensitive data until the prescribed release
time and make it available at the release time. However, such
a centralized approach limits the data protection to a single
point of trust and a single point of control. Even in cases when
the service providers are trustworthy, such centralized models
lead to channels of attacks beyond the control of service
providers for an adversary to breach the security and privacy
of the data. It includes insider attacks [18], [34], external
attacks on the centralized data infrastructures, malware and
large-scale denial-of-service attacks [2], [9]. In 2014, 28% of
the respondents of the US State of Cybercrime Survey [18]
reported being victims of insider attacks and 32% reported that
insider attacks were more damaging than outsider attacks.
In this paper, we develop a decentralized self-emerging
data release system over Ethereum blockchain networks [40]
that does not involve a single point of trust or control. The
proposed mechanisms route the self-emerging data within the
blockchain infrastructure and enable it to automatically appear
at the release time while making it harder for an adversary to
access it prior to the release time. The choice of Blockchains
as the underlying data infrastructure network is motivated by
the facts that Blockchains are huge-scale massively distributed
systems that make complete decentralization possible and they
are inherently designed to be reliable and robust to failures.
Our smart contract implementation recruits a set of Ethereum
peers to jointly follow the proposed timed-release service pro-
tocol allowing the participating peers to earn the remuneration
paid by the service users. Meanwhile, the recruited peers need
to pay security deposits so that any detected misbehaviors
can result in the deposits being confiscated. Specifically, we
model the problem as an extensive-form game with imperfect
information to protect against possible post-facto misbehaviors
including some peers destroying the private data (drop attack)
or secretly releasing the private data before the release time
(release-ahead attack). Through a careful design of the smart
contract based on game theory, we demonstrate that the best
choice of any rational Ethereum peer in the proposed technique
is to always honestly follow the correct protocol. We validate
the efficacy and attack-resilience of the proposed techniques
through rigorous analysis and experimental evaluation on the
Ethereum official test network. The experiments demonstrate
the low monetary cost and the low time overhead associated
with the proposed approach and validate its guaranteed secu-
rity properties.
In the rest of the paper, we first introduce the self-emerging
data release system in Section II. Then, in Section III, we
present the timed-release service protocol in detail. In Section
IV, we implement and evaluate the proposed protocol on the
Ethereum official test network. Finally, we present the related
work in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
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Fig. 1: Self-emerging data release system
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed self-
emerging data release system and we introduce the key ideas
behind the proposed timed-release service protocol.
A. Self-emerging data release system
The proposed self-emerging data release system consists
of four key components (Figure 1) namely data senders,
data receivers, a cloud storage platform and the blockchain
infrastructure enabling the timed data release service.
Data sender (S): Data senders have private data to be released
to data recipients at a future point in time. At setup time ts,
a data sender encrypts the private data using a secret key,
sends the encrypted data to a cloud storage system and sends
the encrypted secret key into the blockchain infrastructure for
timed release at the expected release time tr.
Data recipient (R): Data recipients receive the private data at
the expected data release time tr. While the encrypted private
data can be downloaded from the cloud at any time, the secret
key from the blockchain infrastructure can be released to data
recipients only at tr determined by data senders.
Cloud: A cloud storage platform is used as a medium for data
senders to transfer the encrypted private data to data recipients.
Blockchain infrastructure: The blockchain infrastructure
forms the core component of the self-emerging data release
system. It implements the protocols necessary for offering
timed-release services to data senders.
B. Timed-release service protocol
The proposed timed-release service protocol recruits peers
from the blockchain peer-to-peer network to store the data
during [ts, tr] and release the data to the recipients at tr.
The protocol allows any peer to join the system at any time
and declare any time period during which they are willing
to provide services. In case that no single peer can handle
the entire [ts, tr] time period, the protocol can split [ts, tr]
into a series of successive shorter time durations, each of
which is handled by a different peer. In the example shown in
Figure 1, the storage time duration [ts, tr] is split into three
fractions and the encrypted secret key is passed from sender S
to recipient R through a routing path formed by P1, P2 and P3.
The proposed protocol enables such a routing scheme through
onion routing [20] that requires the sender to first encrypt
the secret key using the public key of the recipient and then
iteratively form layers of encryption using the public keys of
the selected peers on the routing path. As a result, each peer
on the routing path decrypts one layer of the encryption of
the secret key using their private keys before forwarding it to
the subsequent peers on the path until it reaches the recipient
who decrypts the final layer of the encryption to obtain the
key in plain text. The protocol incentivizes the participating
peers by requiring the data senders to pay remunerations to the
peers for obtaining the store and forward services from them to
route the encrypted key along. Also, the protocol requires the
participating peers to pay security deposits so that any detected
misbehavior can result in their deposits being confiscated.
The timed-release service protocol satisfies two key require-
ments in order to be effective in practice. First, it ensures
credibility so that senders, recipients and peers are guaranteed
that they all see the same protocol when they participate in the
timed-release service. We implement the timed-release service
protocol using the Ethereum smart contract platform [40]
which ensures that when smart contracts get deployed into
the blockchain infrastructure, the protocol can be recorded in
the blockchain and be available to the public and becomes
nearly tamper-proof unless someone controls a majority of
computation power of the distributed network [3]. Second, the
protocol needs to be enforceable so that peers are guaranteed
to receive remunerations for honestly performing the agreed
services while being penalized for any misbehavior or failure
to render the promised service. In our approach, the protocol
forces the participants to pass the ownership of their money
to the smart contract such that it ensures that the only way
to receive payment from the smart contract is to trigger the
contract with a satisfied condition dictated in the protocol.
The proposed protocol consists of four key components
which are briefly introduced here and we will present their
detailed design in Section III.
Peer registration: At any point in time, a new peer 1 P can
register by paying a security deposit to the contract to be
added into the registration list maintained by the contract.
This process makes the entire network learn that the peer
has registered and can provide services during its prescribed
working times. For example, in Figure 1, we find that P1, P2
and P3 have been registered before the setup time ts.
Service setup: At any point in time, a sender S can pay
remunerations and submit peers selected from the registration
list to a contract C and set up a timed-release service. This
1A peer in this work refers to an externally owned account in Ethereum.
process makes the service to be recorded by a service list
maintained by the contract. In Figure 1, we find that sender S
requests a service at ts with selected peers P1, P2 and P3.
Service enforcement: After a service has been set up, the
participants, namely sender S, recipient R and peers P s
should follow the protocol honestly in order to render the
service successfully. Behaviors violating the protocol will lead
to service failure and such misbehaviors are detected and
penalized by the contract. In Figure 1, the process of routing
the encrypted secret key from S to R through the path formed
by the three peers is enforced by the contract C through paying
remunerations for honest behaviors while confiscating deposits
for misbehaviors detected by C.
Reporting mechanism: To effectively detect misbehaviors in
the protocol implemented in the smart contract, the report-
ing mechanism incentivizes peers to report misbehaviors by
announcing an award in the contract.
C. Attack models
In our work, we model adversaries with rationality and
consider two key post-facto attack models, namely drop attack
and release-ahead attack.
Rational adversaries: Recently, it has been widely recognized
that assuming an adversary to be semi-honest or malicious is
either too weak or too strong in many practical cases and
hence modeling adversaries with rationality [21], [23], [24],
[37] is a relevant choice in several attack scenarios. Informally,
a semi-honest adversary follows the prescribed protocol but
tries to glean more information from available intermediate
results while a malicious adversary can take any action for
launching attacks [25], [41]. A rational adversary lies in the
middle of the two types. That is, rational adversaries are
self-interest-driven, they choose to violate protocols, such as
colluding with other parties, only when doing so brings them a
higher profit. In this paper, in order to design our system with
strong and practical security guarantees, we model all involved
participants, namely S, R and P , to be rational adversaries
without assuming any of them to be honest.
Post-facto attacks: The system targets post-facto attacks,
namely the attacks launched after the data senders decide to
release their private data. In many use cases, data senders, as
the source of the private data and the initiator of the process,
can determine whether to release the data and when the data
should be released. For example, at a certain time point, Carol
may decide to draw up a will before anyone else knows
her plan. Then, by treating this time point as the registration
deadline td and only selecting peers from the registration list
that were registered before td, it can be guaranteed that all the
selected peers were not intentionally registered for attacking
just her data. In the rest of the paper, we assume that such a
registration deadline td exists, which allows us to focus on the
more common and severe attack models, namely drop attack
and release-ahead attack through peer bribery.
Drop attack: A drop attack happens when the encrypted secret
key fails to reach the recipient R at release time tr. For
example, in Figure 1, after receiving the encrypted secret key
from peer P2, peer P3 may decide to destroy it. In post-facto
attacks, due to the existence of the security deposit, a rational
peer has no motivation to destroy the data. However, we notice
that a drop attack can happen when an adversary intends to
bribe the selected peer (say, P3). Specifically, a drop attack
can be successful when the rational adversary gets higher profit
from the drop attack than the paid bribery and when the bribee
receives higher bribery than the drop penalty. To break the win-
win situation, we carefully design the detection mechanism in
Section III-C to make drop attacks detectable and to allow
the reporting mechanism in Section III-D to distinguish and
penalize the adversaries. In addition, by modeling the protocol
as an extensive-form game with imperfect information [29],
we demonstrate that drop attack can be entirely prevented in
our rational model.
Release-ahead attack: In release-ahead attacks, an adversary
aims to obtain the secret key before the actual release time
tr and earn a profit by utilizing the data prior to the release
time. In Figure 1, peer P3 can launch a release-ahead attack
by releasing the encrypted secret key to recipient R before
tr. Similar to drop attacks, release-ahead attacks may happen
through peer bribery in post-facto attacks. However, unlike
drop attacks that can be detected, a release-ahead attack
happens secretly as peers on the path can share stored data to
any party without leaving a mark. Our proposed techniques
handle this challenge by designing a reporting mechanism
to model the release-ahead attack as an extensive-form game
with imperfect information (Section III-D). It makes rational
adversaries choose to never launch release-ahead attacks as the
game ensures that the best choice of any rational Ethereum
peer is to always honestly follow the correct protocol.
D. Assumptions
We make the following key assumptions in this paper:
• We assume that the monetary value of the private data
is known to the sender S. That is, the maximum profit
made by an adversary from the two attack models, without
considering the deposit penalty, is bounded by this value.
• Although techniques such as mixing [17] have been pro-
posed, it is still unclear whether identification of peers can
be adequately protected in the Ethereum network. Therefore,
we assume that adversaries have the ability to communicate
with any Ethereum peers and we assume no protection of
pseudonymity or anonymity.
• We also assume that an adversary and the peers in commu-
nication do not trust each other as otherwise their cost-free
collusion violates the rationality assumption of all parties.
• Our system employs the use of Whisper protocol [12] to
enable communication between two Ethereum peers. We
assume that a private channel generated using the Whisper
protocol between any two Ethereum peers is safe and secure.
• Finally, we assume that the number of registered peers is
adequate for providing the required service. We precisely
assume that there are at least two different available regis-
tered peers at any moment for each service request.
III. TIMED-RELEASE SERVICE PROTOCOL
We present the proposed timed-release service protocol
organized along four subsections, each of which discusses a
key component of the protocol. The notations used in this
section are summarized in Table I.
A. Peer registration
In this subsection, we present the first part of the protocol,
peer registration, designed for allowing peers to make them-
selves known to the network. After presenting the protocol, we
discuss the peer working window and deposit management in
more detail. To set up timed-release services, a prerequisite
is to have a platform for making peers P s and data senders
Ss know each other. Since peers and senders have no trust
in each other, instead of a face-to-face negotiation, they need
to transfer their information (peer working window Tw and
sender storage window T s) and money (remuneration and
deposit) to the decentralized smart contract C and treat C
as a trusted intermediary to put the deal through. A new peer
registers by sending their working windows, public keys and
deposit to join the contract C. This information is recorded in
the registration list maintained by C.
Peer registration protocol
1. To be registered, each peer must submit a set of future working
windows Tws and a public key to contract C. It must also pay
a deposit to contract C as assurance of no misbehavior while
providing future services.
2. Each peer agrees to complete any assigned jobs.
3. Each peer agrees to allow the contract to freeze a part of its
deposit for an assigned job until the job is completed.
4. Each peer agrees to renew the public key for each job.
5. Each peer can modify working windows Tws and the unfrozen
deposit at any time, but jobs assigned before modification
should still be completed.
Peer working windows: As discussed in Section II-B, the
proposed timed-release service protocol splits a long storage
time duration, T s into a series of successive shorter time
durations, each of which is handled by a different peer during
its working window, Tw, as the encrypted secret key gets
routed on the blockchain network. Figure 2 shows an example
representing Tw as horizontal segments in a coordinate frame
with timeline and peer indexes as x and y axes respectively.
Here, the segment at the bottom-left corner represents a
working window [t1, t2] belonging to Pi.
Deposit management mechanism: The proposed protocol
uses deposits as a mechanism to penalize peer misbehaviors in
order to prevent drop and release-ahead attacks. Senders may
want to pay more for getting a higher deposit from peers as
guarantees of their behaviors to send private data with higher
monetary value v. To support such requirements, we design
a dynamic deposit management mechanism that incorporates
deposit with two states: frozen and unfrozen. One can imagine
that each peer has a deposit account in contract C. The deposit
account is opened after registration and its balance is denoted
as da. Initially, da is unfrozen. Later, data senders can calculate
the amount of deposit they want from peers, denoted as ds,
based on the monetary value of the private data v. Then,
TABLE I: Summary of notations
Notations Descriptions
Te
m
po
ra
l
t, T, |T | Time point, time window, length of a window.
Tw = [tb, te]
Peer working window, which begins at tb and
ends at te.
T s = [ts, tr]
Sender storage window, from setup time ts to
release time tr .
|Tt| Data transfer period.
M
on
et
ar
y
v Monetary value of private data sent to recipient.
da Balance of a deposit account.
ds Deposit required by a service.
r, r̂
Remuneration paid by sender to one peer or all
peers.
p Payment charged at the setup time.
c Cost of a selected peer during a service.
a Reporting award of a service.
during service setup, senders should only select peers from
the registration list with at least ds unfrozen deposit. The
amount of ds deposit, once being verified by contract C, will
be frozen from accounts of selected peers until the end of their
services. At any time, each peer can only manage its unfrozen
deposit in account as the ownership of the frozen part has been
temporarily transferred to contract C. In this way, the designed
deposit management mechanism encourages peers with secure
storage environment to keep a high deposit balance so that
they can get jobs requiring a higher deposit ds to earn more
payments by taking higher risk.
B. Service setup
Next, we present the second part of the protocol, namely
service setup, designed for allowing senders to select peers
from the registration list based on their requirements and set
up the service with contract C after paying remunerations.
We first present the protocol description for service setup and
then illustrate the remuneration computation and peer selection
algorithm in detail.
Service setup protocol
1. Before setup time ts, senders compute the remuneration r̂ and
deposit ds required by this service and then locally run the
peer selection algorithm to select peers from the registration
list satisfying their requirements.
2. At setup time ts, senders submit service information including
selected peers to contract C. Also, both sender S and recipient
R should pay p > ds + r̂ to contract C.
3. Upon receiving a setup request, contract C calculates remu-
neration r̂ and deposit ds of this service, then:
3.1. If p > ds + r̂ and each selected peer has unfrozen deposit
higher than ds, C will approve the setup, freeze ds of
selected peers and refund p− ds − r̂ to S, p− ds to R.
3.2. Otherwise, C will reject the setup and refund p to S, R.
Remuneration computation: The total remuneration r̂ paid
by the sender consists of two parts r̂c and r̂s. The r̂c compo-
nent is charged to compensate the cost of peers for invoking
functions of contract C during the service, so r̂c = krc for k
selected peers. The r̂s component is charged to reward peers
for storing the secret key, so it should be higher for longer
storage time |T s|. Meanwhile, to encourage more peers to
serve for long-term storage, senders should be charged more
for a later storage hour closer to release time tr than an
Fig. 2: Peer selection
earlier one closer to setup time ts. Therefore, if we represent
the charge of ith storage hour as 4ris and set the first hour
charge as 4r1s , by setting per hour increment of 4ris as
α, we get 4ris = 4ri−1s + α, which further gives r̂s =
|T s|[4r1s+4r1s+(|T s|−1)α]
2 = |T s|4r1s + |T
s|(|T s|−1)
2 α. Addi-
tionally, S should be charged more for a higher monetary value
of private data v as an incentive to make peers maintain higher
balance in deposit accounts, so we consider the above r̂c and
r̂s as the charging standard when v = 4v (e.g., 4v = $100)
and adjust the final r̂ based on that. To sum up, a sender should
pay remuneration r̂ = (d v4v e)β [krc+|T s|4r1s+ |T
s|(|T s|−1)
2 α]
in total and a peer serving for ith to jth hours in T s should be
paid r = (d v4v e)β [rc + (j − i)4r1s + i+j−22 α], where α > 0
and β > 1.
Peer selection: The peer selection algorithm has two objec-
tives, namely (i) minimizing remunerations paid by senders
and (ii) maximizing the expected profit made by the peers.
To realize the first objective, we note that the only way to
reduce remuneration r̂ is to make k smaller, namely selecting
fewer peers for a service, which does not impact the expected
profit r earned by selected peers as r̂s is fixed. For achieving
the second objective, we need the algorithm to always pick
earlier hours in peer working windows Tws first so that deposit
ds can be unfrozen as soon as possible. For example, the
algorithm needs to pick just one hour from a ten-hour Tw
for a one-hour service. By picking the last hour in Tw, that
peer only receives an one-hour profit because deposit ds has
to be frozen for the entire ten hours. In contrast, by picking
the first hour, since deposit ds will be unfrozen after one hour,
the door for accepting new jobs is reopened and that peer can
make a ten-hour profit in the best case. We design a greedy
algorithm to achieve both of these objectives simultaneously.
By decomposing the peer selection problem into a series of
subproblems, we define each subproblem as ‘given all peer
working windows Tws covering an input time point, output the
Tw that makes the total number of selected peers minimum’.
Once a Tw is selected, its beginning time tb is then used as
the input time point of the subsequent subproblem to select
the next peer. Intuitively, in a subproblem, the greedy choice is
to pick the Tw with earliest tb. Next, we demonstrate the peer
selection process with an example in Figure 2. The pseudo-
code and demonstration of the peer selection algorithm can be
found in Appendix A.
In the example, instead of release time tr, the algorithm
takes tr + |Tt| as the input time point of the first-round
subproblem as we need to leave a buffer zone |Tt| for data
transfer between each pair of adjacent peers on path. In the first
round, there are three available peer working windows Tws
covering tr + |Tt| and obviously Tw3 , due to its earliest begin
time tb among the three, is the greedy choice. As a result, we
select P3 as the last peer on path and set Tw3 .tb+ |Ti| as input
of the second-round subproblem. We then get Tw2 as second-
round greedy choice, so we select P2 and set Tw2 .tb + |Ti|
as input of the third-round subproblem, which gives Tw1 as
third-round greedy choice to pick P1. This is the end of peer
selection process as Tw1 has already covered setup time.
C. Service enforcement
The third component of the protocol deals with service en-
forcement that specifies the behaviors that should be followed
by the sender S, recipient R and peers, P s during the service
process to render the service successfully. The protocol sets
deadlines for each behavior and treats any missing behavior
as a drop attack to enable drop attacks behavior to be de-
tectable. Next, we present the protocol with a discussion on
the designed behaviors. We then model the protocol as an
extensive-form game with imperfect information to prove that
any rational participating peer will always follow the protocol
honestly.
Service enforcement protocol
1. Before time ts + |Tt|, the sender must submit hashes of
certificates, hash of the secret key cyphertext (only encrypted
by the recipient’s public key) and finally the encrypted whisper
key to contract C. It must also encrypt the secret key using
public keys of selected peers and transfer it to the first peer.
2. Each selected peer must decrypt one layer of the received
encrypted secret key, submit the obtained certificate to contract
C and verify the behavior of previous participants before its
first deadline d1. It must submit encrypted whisper key to
contract C before its second deadline d2 and transfer the secret
key to the next peer before its third deadline d3.
3. Before time tr + |Tt|, the recipient must first decrypt the
last layer of the encrypted secret key to submit the obtained
certificate to contract C and then verify the behavior of both
the previous participants and the recipient itself.
4. If any verification launched by a peer (or recipient) in term 2
(or 3) gives False, C should immediately terminate the service
and judge the last participant on the path that fails to pass the
verification to be guilty. Then, C should refund deposit ds to
all innocent participants, pay remuneration r to innocent peers
and issue confiscated ds and unused r to sender.
5. If a verification gives Ture, contract C should refund deposit
ds and pay remuneration r to all participants that have already
honestly finished their job before their deadlines.
Whisper key submission: Our system employs the Whisper
protocol [12] to transfer secret keys between any two Ethereum
peers by building private channels with symmetrical whisper
keys. Specifically, the first peer should encrypt its whisper key
with the public key of the second peer and submit it to contract
C so that only the second peer can get the whisper key and
set up the channel.
Certificate: We design certificates for detecting drop attacks.
For each peer and recipient, we need the sender to secretly
Fig. 3: Game tree induced by service enforcement protocol
generate a unique certificate and package it along with the
corresponding layer of the encrypted secret key. Therefore,
upon decrypting the received encrypted secret key with the
private key, the peer (or recipient) will get the unique certifi-
cate. The peer (or recipient) then should submit the certificate
to contract C. If the hash of the submitted certificate is same as
the one submitted by sender, the correct reception of encrypted
secret key can be proved. Otherwise, a drop attack is detected.
However, with certificates, we can only detect that a drop
attack has happened between two adjacent peers. It is hard to
further figure out which of the two peers launched the attack
as the channel between them is private. We will discuss how
to handle such a dispute in Section III-D.
Verification: We design verification as a function of contract
C for enforcing submission of whisper keys and certificates.
A missing whisper key or certificate, both causing a drop
attack, cannot be automatically detected by contract C. Here,
we need the verification function to be triggered by Ethereum
peers to check whether the submissions have been made
on time. If all the submissions have been correctly made
until the time of verification, the function returns a True.
Otherwise, it returns a False. For each timed-release service,
multiple verifications are required to detect a drop attack in a
timely manner so that the service can be terminated on time
and deposits of innocent peers can be unfrozen quickly. We
carefully design the protocol as an extensive-form game with
imperfect information to prove that any rational participant in
this game will always choose to submit both whisper key and
certificate on time.
The game induced by the protocol: We model the protocol
as an extensive-form game with imperfect information [29],
which can be represented as a game tree in Figure 3. For ease
of explanation, the example only has one peer P between
sender S and recipient R on path, but the services with
more peers follow the same result. The game has three
players {S, P,R}. Its basic actions are (whisper key and/or
certificate) submission (s) and verification (v), so the action
set is {s, v, s¯, v¯, sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯}, where s¯ and v¯ represent no
submission and no verification respectively and sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯
stand for the combinations. The game tree consists of choice
nodes {n0, ..., n14} and terminal nodes {n15, ..., n30}. At the
beginning of the game, sender S ({n0}) can choose either to
submit whisper key or not by taking one action from {s, s¯}.
Then, the game moves to peer P ({n1, n2}), who has no idea
about the choice made by sender S (imperfect information).
The peer P should choose one action from {sv, sv¯, s¯v, s¯v¯},
namely four combinations of doing submission and verifica-
tion or not, but we argue that sv¯ and s¯v can be omitted.
The reason is that a peer P choosing sv¯ gets same payoff
as choosing sv if no previous player has chosen s¯ as there is
no need of verification in this situation. In contrast, if there is
at least one previous player who has chosen s¯, the payoff by
choosing sv¯ is equal to that of choosing s¯v¯ as there is no need
of submission when a drop attack has been launched earlier.
As a result, sv¯ can be replaced by sv and s¯v¯, and it is also
true for s¯v. Finally, the game goes to the turn of recipient R
({n3, n4}, {n5, n6}), who has no idea of the action taken by
sender S and peer P . Similar to P , recipient R should choose
one action from {sv, s¯v¯}, but s here only means the certificate
submission as it is the last peer on the path.
We now analyze the payoffs shown under the terminal
nodes, where uS , uP and uR represent payoff of sender
S, peer P and recipient R respectively. The payoffs have
uncertainty. Most peers on the path, by dropping the encrypted
secret key, can only save a service cost c, but some peers can
get an additional profit no more than the monetary value of
the private data v (for ease of presentation, we represent it
as v in this game). Therefore, it is uncertain whether peer P
and receipt R can get the additional benefit v from dropping
the package. To model this uncertainty, we use P and R
to represent the ones only targeting at c and P¯ and R¯ to
represent the ones also targeting at v. By considering this
uncertainty, this game can be modeled as a more sophisticated
Bayesian game [13]. However, we find that the four situations
in this game ({PR,PR¯, P¯R, P¯ R¯}) can reach the same Nash
equilibrium [36] and therefore, for ease of explanation, we
will only analyze the situation that both peer P and recipient
R can get additional benefit v, namely P¯ R¯.
In P¯ R¯, we will show that if deposit ds > v is satisfied,
then the best choice of each player is to do both submission
and verification on time. We start from analyzing the choice
of recipient R between sv and s¯v¯ at the last step of this game.
At n3, by choosing sv, R gets 0 at n7, which is higher than
uR = v− ds at n8 if s¯v¯ is chosen and ds > v is satisfied. By
further checking n4 to n6, we can find sv always brings uR
no less than uR from s¯v¯, which proves that sv dominates s¯v¯
and R should always choose sv no matter how the game has
been played before. Following the same rule, peer P should
always choose sv at {n1, n2} if ds > v − (r − c) is satisfied.
Since we need r > c to make P s get positive profit from the
service, ds > v − (r− c) can be automatically satisfied when
ds > v. Finally, with the same rule, sender S should always
choose s at n0.
In game theory, if by taking a strategy, a player can make
the expected payoff no less than that induced by taking any
other strategy no matter what strategies are taken by other
players, this strategy will become his or her best response. If
all the players are taking their best responses, the game will
reach a Nash equilibrium [36]. Nash equilibrium is the most
important solution concept in game theory, which describes a
situation that every player chooses the best response and no
one can make payoff higher by changing strategy if no one else
changes strategy. In this game, the Nash equilibrium is reached
when all the players follow the bold edges, which results in all
rational players, whether they are sender, recipient or peers,
choosing to honestly obey the protocol.
D. Reporting mechanism
In this subsection, we present the last part of the protocol,
namely reporting, designed for handling both release-ahead
attacks and the dispute of drop attacks that are hard to be
detected by service enforcement protocol.
Reporting protocol
1. Any peer can report a release-ahead attack to contract C
with evidence before tr . If the evidence is true, contract C
should judge the suspect to be guilty, confiscate its deposit
ds and terminate the service. Then, contract C should refund
deposit ds to all innocent participants, pay remuneration r to
all innocent peers, and finally split deposit ds of the suspect to
an award a paying to the reporter and the rest dp − a paying
to the sender.
2. Any peer on the path can report a dispute of drop attack
between a suspect (the peer before this reporter on path) and
the reporter to contract C before deposit ds of the suspect
is unfrozen. Upon receiving the report, contract C should
terminate the service and confiscate ds of S, suspect and
reporter. Then, contract C should refund ds to all innocent
participants and pay remuneration r to all innocent peers. The
confiscated 3ds should be split to an award a paying to the
reporter and the rest 3dp − a locked in contract C without
being able to be withdrawn by anyone including the contract
designer.
Release-ahead attack: As discussed in Section II-C, it is
highly difficult to detect a secret release attack made by
peers on the path. We design a reporting mechanism to
enable a release-ahead attack to be reported with evidence by
adversaries themselves. The evidence should be the secret key
cyphertext (only encrypted by recipient’s public key), which is
a necessity for any adversary (including the recipient) to obtain
the secret key plaintext because its correctness can be checked
with the hash value stored in blockchain, thus protecting the
adversary from being cheated by the untrusted bribee. The
secret key cyphertext (only encrypted by recipient’s public
key) uploaded before tr proves that the last selected peer
on path has released the data. Then, contract C can verify
the correctness of the evidence with the hash value stored in
blockchain. If the evidence is proved to be true, the adversary
will get an award, a from contract C while the last selected
peer will lose its deposit ds. It may sound irrational not to
penalize but reward the adversary. However, this anti-intuitive
reporting mechanism is an effective way to prevent release-
ahead attacks as long as both adversary and the peer are
rational. In the game between them, the best response of the
adversary is to always report the peer to earn the award a from
Sections Invokers Functions Purposes
R
eg
is
te
r P newPeer register a new Peer
P updateBalance update deposit balance
P updateWindow update working windows
P updatePubKey update public keys
Se
tu
p S senderSign sender signs the contract
R recipientSign recipient signs the contract
S setup setup the service
E
nf
or
ce
S setCert submit hashes of certificates
P,R verifyCert verify received certificates
P setWhisperKey submit encrypted whisper keys
P,R verification do verification
R
ep
or
t Any releaseReport report a release-ahead attack
Any releaseAward get award for reporting release
P,R dropReport report a drop attack
P,R dropAward get award for reporting drop
TABLE II: Summary of functions in the smart contract
contract C without any penalty. Based on this knowledge, the
best response of any peer on the path is to never accept bribery.
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of this game makes such a
release-ahead attack never happen.
Dispute of drop attack: As discussed in Section III-C, drop
attacks cannot be solely prevented by verifications. After a
drop attack is detected between two adjacent peers on the
path when the second peer between the two fails to submit the
correct certificate, it is hard to figure out which peer actually
launched it. It can be either launched by the first peer by not
sending the correct encrypted secret key to the second peer
or by the second peer by maliciously denying the reception of
the encrypted secret key. In addition, it can be launched by the
sender S by submitting fake hashes of certificates to contract C
at the very beginning. To solve it, we allow the second account
to report the dispute. Upon receiving the report, contract C
should confiscate deposit ds of the three participants and send
back an award a to the second peer. Again, this anti-intuitive
reporting mechanism is an effective way to prevent drop attack
dispute by making the three participants as a community of
interests as long as these accounts are rational. In this game,
when there is a drop attack, the second peer has the dominant
action to always report the dispute because it will lose part of
its deposit ds − a by reporting it but lose the entire deposit
ds due to the missing certificate by not reporting it. With this
knowledge, the best response of the first peer and sender is to
never launch a drop attack because otherwise they will lose
the entire deposit ds > v due to the report. Finally, given the
best response of the first peer and sender, if ds > v + a is
satisfied, the best response of the second peer is also to never
launch a drop attack because otherwise it will lose ds−a > v
due to the report. As a result, the Nash equilibrium is reached
when all of them choose to never launch a drop attack.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the pro-
posed self-emerging data release smart contract and experi-
mentally evaluate its performance and security.
A. Implementation
We first introduce the implementation setup and then present
the functions created in the smart contract and demonstrate
(a) All windows (b) Selected windows (300h) (c) Selected windows (600h) (d) Selected windows (1000h)
Fig. 4: Peer selection
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Fig. 5: Performance evaluation
how they work in practice. Finally, we present the test instance
for our experimental evaluation.
Setup: We programmed the smart contract in the contract-
oriented programming language Solidity [10], deployed it to
the Ethereum official test network rinkeby [8] and tested it with
Ethereum official Go implementation Geth [5]. We used the
SolRsaVerify contract [11] to verify signatures in the release
reporting mechanism. We ran our experiments on an Intel Core
i7 2.70GHz PC with 16GB RAM.
Contract functions: We design the smart contract to include
15 main functions for supporting the four parts of protocol
presented in Section III. The functions are shown in Table II
with their respective invokers and purposes. For example,
function newPeer() is designed to be invoked by peers during
registration phase for being registered into the list.
• Registration: Peers (P s) can first invoke newPeer() to be
registered and recorded into the peer list and then manage
their unfrozen deposit balance, working windows and public
keys through the other three functions.
• Setup: A sender (S) should download the peer list, locally
run peer selection algorithm to select peers from the list and
estimate remuneration r. Then, S should sign the contract
through senderSign() and also inform the recipient (R) to
sign it through recipientSign(). Finally, S should invoke
setup() to complete service setup and the smart contract (C)
will freeze deposit ds of each selected P after verifying
payments of S and R and record the service information
into the service list.
• Enforce: At the beginning of a service, S should invoke
setCert() to submit hashes of certificates to C. Then, during
the service process, verifyCert() is invoked by P s and R to
submit certifications, setWhisperKey() is invoked by P s to
submit encrypted whisper key and verification() is invoked
by P s and R to do verification.
• Report: Any Ethereum peer can invoke releaseReport()
to report a release-ahead attack and get award through
releaseAward() after the report has been verified to be
correct. Similarly, P and R on path can report a drop attack
through dropReport() and get award through dropAward().
Test instance: For testing purpose, we generated 100
Ethereum accounts to be registered as peers. Each peer offers
one working window represented as a horizontal segment in
Figure 4(a). We design an input parameter Time to simulate
the time during testing. As can be seen, the 100 working
windows are distributed in the future 1200 hours. Their start
times follow an exponential distribution with a mean of 300
hours while their lengths follow a normal distribution with a
mean of 15 hours and a standard deviation of 5 hours. The
reason is that we believe more peers may want to serve in the
nearer future due to its lower uncertainty. From Figure 4(b)
to 4(d), we show the results of peer selection algorithm for
sending the private data to 300, 600 and 1000 hours in the
future by selecting two, three and five peers respectively. The
storage on each selected P , upon hitting the dotted line, will
be transferred to the next P . In all cases, storage on each P
starts from the beginning of its window, which signifies the
design goal of the peer selection algorithm.
B. Experimental evaluation
We use the presented test instance to experimentally eval-
uate the performance and security of the smart contract. We
begin by first evaluating the monetary cost and time overhead
of the functions and then test the contract in different condi-
tions including drop attack and release-ahead attack scenarios.
Monetary cost: The monetary costs of functions in Table II
for the three-peer case in Figure 4(c) are shown in Figure 5(a).
The results shown represent the maximum possible monetary
costs for invoking the functions. For ease of presentation,
results are grouped into four clusters. Each cluster represents
a protocol subsection and contains three or four functions
following their order in Table II. In Ethereum, each function
call will cost some gases if it changes the state of contract.
Therefore, the raw data measured here is the gas cost of each
function, which is then transferred to cost in $ based on 1
gas = 1.0371979124 × 10−8 ETH and 1 ETH = $300 as of
date, 10/29/2017 [4]. As can be seen, most functions cost very
little. Specifically, among the fifteen functions, eight cost lower
than $0.2 and twelve cost lower than $0.3. The remaining
three functions are newPeer() ($0.86), senderSign() ($0.73)
and setup() ($2.29). They cost higher as data is stored into
the registration list and service list in C through the three
functions. However, since each P only calls newPeer() for
once during registration and each S only calls senderSign()
and setup() once during service setup, these costs are quite
acceptable in practice. Thus, in case of three selected P s, a
timed-release service costs $5.07 in total, including $3.33 cost
incurred by S, $0.44 cost incurred by each P and $0.41 cost
incurred by R. To study the scalability of the self-emerging
data smart contract, we measured the monetary costs of the
functions for the five-peer case in Figure 4(d) as Figure 5(b).
Compared with Figure 5(a), only costs of three functions
setup(), setCert() and verification() are increased as a higher
number of selected P s requires more data to be stored in data
list with more certificates and more rounds of verifications.
However, the increments of setCert() and verification() are
quite small and the increment of setup() from $2.29 to $3.56 is
not a drastic overhead for storing the private data for a longer
duration of 1000 hours.
Time overhead: The time overheads of functions in Table II
for the three-peer case in Figure 4(c) are shown in Figure 5(c).
All results are averaged for 100 tests. Among the fifteen
functions, nine spent 0-200ms, three spent 200-300ms and two
spent 300-400ms. The setup() function spent the maximum
time of 515ms due to the large amount of service data for
storing. Again, we tested the five-peer case in Figure 4(d)
and showed the results in Figure 5(d). The two more selected
peers make the same three functions setup(), setCert() and
verification() spend more time for the same reasons. Here
again, the increments are quite acceptable. In addition, we
tested the time overhead of the peer selection algorithm, which
shows that the algorithm is quite efficient by spending less than
20ms for even a peer list with 1000 working windows.
Security evaluation: Finally, we evaluate the security protec-
tion offered by the smart contract by testing the results of a
timed-release service in different conditions when the S, R
and P s engage in suspicious behaviors, shown in Table III.
The test is based on the five-peer case in Figure 4(d) and the
parameters about remuneration are set as α = 0.000012 ETH,
β = 1.1, 4r1s = 0.000001 ETH, 4v = 1 ETH, rt = 0.002
ETH respectively. The parameter setting can be adjusted, but
it should not make the remuneration too low as in that case,
one may not be incentivized to freeze $1000 for half a year
for earning a meager payment of $0.1. In addition, we set
ds = 1.2v and award a = 0.1v.
• Condition 1: Before the service, S, R and the five P s all
hold 5 available ETH. Then, S wants to send a secret key
with its monetary value v = 3 ETH.
• Condition 2: If all the participants follow the protocol
honestly, S can earn 2.872 ETH from the 3 ETH v after
paying 0.128 ETH to P s . Each P can earn its remuneration
based on the length of its service time as well as the distance
Cond S P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 R
1. 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
2. 7.872 5.010 5.017 5.026 5.035 5.040 5
3. 8.489 5.010 4.4 5.026 5.035 5.040 5
4. 8.212 5.310 5.017 5.026 5.035 4.4 5
5. 1.347 5.010 5.017 5.026 4.4 1.7 5
TABLE III: Security evaluation
of its service from the setup time tr. As can be seen, the
P5 offering service for 890h-1000h earns much more than
P1 serving for the first 240 hours.
• Condition 3: If P2 does not submit its whisper key or
certificate on time, its confiscated deposit ds = 3.6 ETH
will make its final payoff to be 5− 3.6 + 3 = 4.4 ETH.
• Condition 4: If P5 releases its data to P2, P2 can report it
to earn the 0.3 ETH award, which will make P5 get 5 −
3.6 + 3 = 4.4 ETH payoff.
• Condition 5: If P4 does not send the secret key to P5 through
the private channel, P5 can report this drop dispute, which
will make P4 get 4.4 ETH payoff. Without reporting it to
earn the 0.3 ETH award, P5 can only get 5 − 3.6 = 1.4
ETH payoff due to the failure of certificate submission.
As can be seen, in conditions 3 to 5, adversaries with mis-
behavior only get 4.4 ETH payoff, which makes them lose
0.6 ETH. Therefore, a rational Ethereum peer should always
choose to honestly follow the protocol resulting in condition 2.
V. RELATED WORK
The problem of revealing private data only after a certain
time in future has been researched for more than two decades.
The problem was first described by May as timed-release
cryptography in 1992 [32] and has intrigued many researchers
in the field of cryptography since then. One set of existing
cryptographic solutions relies on a third party, also known
as a time server, to release the protected information at the
release time in future. The information, sometimes called
time trapdoors, can be used by recipients to decrypt the
encrypted message [15], [19], [27], [28], [33], [38]. Although
efficiency and flexibility of time-server-based approaches have
constantly been improved, the time server in this model has
to be trusted not to collude with recipients so that encrypted
messages cannot be entered before release time. This re-
striction makes this set of solutions involve a single point
of trust. Another set of existing solutions were designed to
make data recipients solve a mathematical puzzle, called time-
lock puzzle, before reading the messages [14], [16], [38].
Such cryptographic solutions suffer from two key drawbacks.
First, due to increasing advancements in computing hardware
and hardware performance, the time taken by such puzzle
computation is not determinate and hence these solutions
cannot tackle the situations that demand the data be released
with a precise release time. Secondly, the puzzle computation
is associated with a significant computation cost. Incurring
such high computation costs for a large big data infrastructure,
such as the one considered in this work, does not lead to a
scalable cost-effective solution.
In another direction of cryptographic solutions using
blockchains [35], the difficulty of PoW (proof-of-work) can
be diversely adjusted to change the average generation time
of each block to a desired value, which makes blockchain
to be a reference time clock with correctness guaranteed by
the distributed network. Therefore, by combining witness en-
cryption [22] with blockchain [26], [31], one can leverage the
computation power of PoW in blockchain to decrypt a message
after a certain number of new blocks have been generated.
However, the current implementation of witness encryption is
far from practical, which requires an astronomical decryption
time estimated to be 2100 seconds [31].
Our preliminary work on decentralized self-emerging data
has studied the problem in the context of Distributed Hash
Table (DHT) networks [30]. The idea behind these techniques
is to leverage the scalability and distributed features of DHT
P2P networks to make message securely hidden before re-
lease time. In contrast to such DHT-based solutions that do
not offer guaranteed resilience to potential misbehaviors, the
decentralized self-emerging data release techniques presented
in this paper employs a blockchain infrastructure that offers
more robust and attractive features including higher protocol
enforceability by using incentives and security deposits.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop decentralized techniques for sup-
porting self-emerging data using smart contracts in Ethereum
blockchain networks. Our proposed timed release service pro-
tocol implemented as a smart contract is nearly immutable in
the Ethereum blockchain. The credibility and enforceability of
the protocol are guaranteed through a careful design based on
extensive-form games with imperfect information to prevent
possible post-facto misbehaviors including drop attacks and
release-ahead attacks. We developed the smart contract using
Solidity and implemented the system on the Ethereum official
test network. Our rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive
experiments demonstrate the low monetary cost and the low
time overhead associated with the proposed approach and
validate its security properties. In future work, we plan to deal
with the situation that powerful adversaries can make their
controlled peers register even before the registration deadline
selected by the data owners. Potential solutions include estab-
lishing a reputation system to make it harder for malicious
peers to be selected or adopting secret share scheme [39] to
transmit shares of a secret key through multiple paths to make
it harder for adversaries to restore the secret key.
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APPENDIX A
We first present the pseudo-code of the peer selection
algorithm and then demonstrate its feature.
Algorithm 1: Peer selection algorithm
Input : Registered peer working window set with enough unfrozen
deposit T̂w , requested sender storage window T s = [ts, tr],
transfer time period |Tt|.
Output: Selected peer working window list T˜w .
1 Initialize tcur = tr , tpre = tr , Twsel;
2 while tpre > ts do
3 for each Tw ∈ T̂w do
4 if Tw.tb < tcur + |Tt| & Tw.te > tcur + |Tt| &
5 Tw.tb < tpre + |Tt| & nonRepeat(Tw) then
6 Twsel = T
w; tpre = Tw.tb;
7 end
8 end
9 if nonRepeat(Twsel) then
10 T˜w ← Twsel; tcur = tpre;
11 end
12 else
13 Fail;
14 end
15 end
The pseudo-code of the peer selection algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1 (we assume peers have passed registration
deadline check and balance check). The peer selection problem
is decomposed into a series of subproblems. For each sub-
problem (loop 2-15), the algorithm traverses all available peer
working windows Tws (loop 3-8) to find the ones satisfying
the conditions that: 1) it covers the input time point of this
round (line 4); 2) it has earlier tb than the ones that have
been traversed (line 5); 3) the peer has not been selected for
this service (line 5). After an eligible Tw is found, the greedy
choice for this round is updated (line 6). Finally, the end of
the traversal gives the greedy choice for the current round
subproblem. If the greedy choice is different from that of the
last round, the algorithm approves it and starts the next round
(line 9-11). Otherwise, the algorithm fails to find available
P s for this service and returns False. The complexity of this
algorithm is O(|T̂w||T˜w|).
Lemma 1. The greedy algorithm that always picks Tw with
earliest tb minimizes the number of selected P for a service.
Proof. Let us consider that the peer selection problem is
decomposed into n rounds of continuous subproblems. If an
algorithm falls behind the greedy algorithm in round i, then
the only way for this algorithm to catch up with the greedy
algorithm at round i + 1 will be to select the greedy choice
of round i + 1 in round i + 1, but this can at most make its
performance same as the greedy algorithm.
